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In early September, the rebels launched their most potent military campaign since 1983, combined
with political-diplomatic efforts to promote a negotiated end to the war and the creation of
a "national consensus government." Based on statements by guerrilla commanders Joaquin
Villalobos and Leonel Gonzalez, the rebels' strategy can be summarized as follows: * The
situation in El Salvador is "highly explosive," outcome of severe economic crisis, dissolution
of the government's power bloc, and failure of the US-imposed counterinsurgency program.
These conditions favor a peaceful settlement in which the FMLN/FDR would share power in a
coalition government. According to the FMLN, a national consensus is developing around leftist
participation in government. * Military pressure is, however, necessary to convince the government,
Washington and the Salvadoran armed forces that any plans to defeat the rebels will only prolong
the war. * The rebels' military actions and political pressure will "detonate" the social explosion
(insurrection). * The objective of high visibility meetings with Latin American leaders was to
attempt to "lower the cost of the explosion [through negotiations], instead of generating greater
bloodshed." (Villalobos) Military Offensive Attacks on military targets. On Sept. 13, the FMLN
attacked the 4th Infantry Brigade at El Paraiso, Chalatenango department, considered one of the
country's best defended military bases. Several barracks and an ammunition depot were destroyed.
According to the FMLN, the Army sustained nearly 300 casualties. The Army claimed 24. This
attack was devastating, not only in terms of direct damage and casualties. During most of 1988 the
Army has focused on deploying most of its fighting force in areas of major rebel strength, such as
Chalatenango and Morazan departments. The US-trained Atlacatl Battalion, one of the Army's
premier counterinsurgency units, was inside El Paraiso at the time of the attack, and suffered
severe casualties. The battalion's losses, combined with the sudden shock of the FMLN's assault,
led to the curtailment of a major Army offensive which had been scheduled to begin on Sept. 16.
On the same day, the FMLN attacked a dozen different Army posts in La Union, San Miguel and
Morazan, driving the soldiers from six towns, including three department capitals. Faced with
these simultaneous attacks, the Army failed to reinforce El Paraiso. Sept. 13 was also important
in that locally based clandestine militia participated, and freshly trained new rebel recruits were
involved. The FMLN's "onslaught" continued through September and October. In September, the
FMLN engaged in several actions in the western department of Santa Ana, and on San Salvador
Volcano, located on the outskirts of the capital. On Sept. 22, rebels partially destroyed an Army
communications center in Corinto, Morazan. Radio Venceremos recorded 1,062 government
casualties for the month of September, the highest monthly total in nearly nine years of war. On
Oct. 4, the FMLN launched an attack on the military's headquarters in Usulutan, El Salvador's third
largest city. On the same day, the FMLN occupied a radio station in the far western department
capital of Ahuachapan, using the station's facilities to broadcast anti-government messages for
several hours. The next day, more than 150 rebels occupied the nearby town of Atiquizaya and
burned a bank to the ground (after making off with approximately $37,000), while simultaneously
assaulting a police garrison. Police forces were so busy fending off another local guerrilla attack
that they were unable to save the bank. On Oct. 6, an estimated several hundred FMLN troops
charged the Army's civil defense post at the town of Zaragoza, located in La Libertad department
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just ten miles from the capital. This attack was important in that local Army officers had repeatedly
characterized the surrounding area as as guerrilla-free zone. Throughout the month of October,
rebel attacks on military targets were reported in San Miguel, Morazan, Usulutan and Suchitoto,
Cuscatlan. On Oct. 23, rebels raided the Ilobasco prison in Cabanas department, located about
20 miles from San Salvador. A military official, who requested anonymity, told UPI that at least
80 guerrillas launched simultaneous raids against the prison and the nearby municipalities of
Tejutepeque and San Jose. He said the rebels attacked the prison with machine guns, grenades
and home-made bombs, inflicting serious damage. On Nov. 1, the FMLN attack on the National
Guard headquarters in San Salvador, killed several soldiers and set fire to the munitions dump.
On the same day, rebel units attacked the National Police and businesses in eastern and western
cities. Beginning in September, the FMLN has staged a series of attacks aimed at civil defense posts,
seeking to block the forced conscription of peasants into the Army's counterinsurgency schemes,
and to prevent ARENA from reviving its paramilitary network in the countryside. Members of
the civil defense are frequently utilized as informers by Army-controlled death squads. Next, in
the past three months rebels stepped up ambushes against Army convoys and patrols. Economic
Sabotage. Economic sabotage continues to be a crucial part of the FMLN's strategy. Rebel attacks
against the national electrical system divert government spending away from the military toward
repair of damaged power lines, while tying down the Army by forcing it to defend the country's
infrastructure. The FMLN's destruction of export crops deprives the government of revenue to
bankroll the war. On Sept. 19, for instance, the FMLN launched the fifth nationwide transport
boycott of the year. A "high visibility" attack on export revenue sources occurred on Oct. 19 when
FMLN units caused over one million dollars in damages to three coffee plantations and their
processing plants located near the city of Santiago de Maria, about 70 miles east of San Salvador,
Usulutan department. One of the plantations is owned by Prudencio Llach, father-in-law of
Defense Minister Gen. Eugenio Vides Casanova, and also father-in-law of ARENA presidential
candidate Alfredo Cristiani. On the same day, rebels freed at least 50 inmates from the local prison.
On Oct. 20, the FMLN announced a new military offensive against economic targets in eastern
El Salvador to mark the eighth anniversary of the guerrilla movement, formed on Oct. 10, 1980,
when five separate groups joined to form the Frente. The anniversary is observed throughout
the month of October. Urban Actions. The FMLN has reportedly reactivated a large number of
urban commando units, and placed large numbers of new commando recruits in the country's
major cities. In coordination with the Sept. 13 on El Paraiso, FMLN units toppled several electrical
towers supplying power to San Salvador's most upscale neighborhoods (such as San Benito and
Escalon). However, the FMLN's urban guerrillas have largely shifted the focus of their attacks
from police stations and electrical grids on the outskirts of San Salvador to daytime actions in the
capital's downtown area. On Oct. 6, the FMLN launched a mid-morning attack on the National
Assembly building, firing rocket-propelled grenades at the walls. The following day, rebels shot
at a US Embassy security vehicle, causing "considerable damage." FMLN urban commandos took
credit for the bombing of a San Salvador movie theater early on Oct. 15. The explosion seriously
damaged the theater, but caused no casualties. In the previous three days, guerrillas placed bomb
charges in three different locations in San Salvador. On Oct. 27, presumed rebels shot a rocket into
the fifth floor of the US Agency for International Development (AID) headquarters in San Salvador.
Damages to the building were reported, but no casualties. The rebels claimed responsibility for
an attack earlier on Oct. 27, in which they placed a homemade bomb in a local massage parlor
and house of prostitution owned by a retired military officer. Material damages but no casualties
were reported. Almost every night in October the FMLN dynamited electrical posts and telephone
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lines in the capital. According to Arnaldo Ramos, a US-based representative of the FMLN/FDR,
"A key objective in taking the war to San Slavador is to let the popular movement know that there
is a people's army, and they will be protected from the genocide they fear from the military."
Political/Diplomatic Actions Since September, senior guerrilla commanders have met with Costa
Rican President Oscar Arias, Peruvian President Alan Garcia, and officials in Ecuador, Argentina,
Panama and Mexico. For Villalobos, this diplomatic tour marked the second time he had (publicly)
left El Salvador since the war began. [Villalobos, 37, a former economics student, is leader of the
People's Revolutionary Army. Gonzalez, 44, whose real name is Salvador Sanchez Sereno, is a
former elementary school teacher, and commands the Popular Liberation Forces. Villalobos' Army
is generally perceived as the FMLN's most effective fighting force and its most hard-line faction.]
Villalobos and Gonzalez said they were seeking to deliver a message to Latin America that the
FMLN was ready for serious negotiations and could be trusted to fulfill promises of maintaining
a mixed economy and pluralistic democracy should it gain a share of power. In statements to
reporters in Costa Rica, Villalobos addressed the US as a determining factor in the type of regime
foreseen by the rebels. He said: "We must consider the United States, because we are in its area
of influence. We understand that. El Salvador's revolution has the best possibility of being broad,
democratic, flexible with a multiplicity of forces... "The Reagan administration has created ghosts,
talking about us like Pol Pot (of Cambodia), saying we do not want political parties, we want one
party, that there will be religious persecution...[The United States] would try to roll it back, so it is
not logical or feasible." Regarding domestic politics, the rebels appear to be coordinating strategy
with mass organizations to "turn the pressure up." Ongoing work stoppages and public protests
continue to fill the streets of San Salvador. These demonstrations are organized by the UNTS
(National Unity of Salvadoran Workers), the country's largest alliance of trade union and peasant
organizations, and the recently organized MPTL (Movement for Bread, Land, Work, and Freedom),
a neighborhood based group which is openly promoting the idea of insurrection. Also participating
in the wave of popular discontent are university students, particularly the student association at
the University of El Salvador. Next, the presidential campaign of the Democratic Convergence is
focused on a negotiated end to the war, and with this, bringing the country's economic chaos under
control. Despite wishful thinking of Salvadoran government officials and military officers, and a
series of rumors appearing in the "western press," the Convergence's dedication to a negotiated
settlement, and the FMLN's military offensive are not contradictory. Nor are there any substantive
indications that the FDR is on the verge of breaking its alliance with the FMLN. Assessment of
Potential for FMLN's "Final Offensive" (Insurrection) It is perhaps premature to talk about a "final
offensive." Nonetheless, the FMLN has clearly taken the government by surprise with the scope
and scale of its fall actions. The Army is confronted on a daily basis with difficult choices on how
to deploy its troops. The massive Army maneuvers which were designed to limit the FMLN to
a few departments have failed. The US Embassy acknowledges that FMLN claims regarding its
presence in all of the country's 14 departments are accurate. Especially interesting in this regard
were the FMLN's actions in western El Salvador. The Ahuachapan area had witnessed little or
no combat in previous years. Expansion of FMLN activity into western El Salvador is important
because these departments have not actively participated in the revolutionary movement in recent
times. Many peasant families still bear the scars of the 1932 massacre, during which the government
executed more than 30,000 people following an aborted revolt based in the west. According to poll
data collected by the Jesuit-run University of Central America (UCA), while disillusion with the
government is widespread, only some 30% of the population has adopted explicitly "radicalized"
politics. The issue in the current leftist debate is what impact this radical nucleus can have on the
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broader population over the coming year. In a recent interview with Bob Ostertag, Pacific News
Service associate editor, UCA Vice Rector Ignacio Martin-Baro said, "People are very conscious of
their misery, of their hunger, even of who is exploiting them. But this doesn't lead them to think
of insurrection." According to Martin-Baro, the rebels remain frustrated by the pervasive fear
among much of the population of participating in leftist activities, a fear resulting from a campaign
of mass political murder waged by ultra-rightist terrorist squads and some military officers in
the early 1980s that left tens of thousands dead. Over the last 12 months such killings have again
begun to increase. The UCA's assessment is generally shared by the Democratic Convergence, but
its spokespersons add that things could change rapidly. According to Zamora, "We don't see the
future as static. There are all kinds of sudden and powerful events that can bring about a change."
Zamora has emphasized the uncertainty surrounding upcoming presidential elections, adding that
electoral frauds imposed by the army nearly provoked insurrections in 1972 and 1977. Publicly,
army officers ridicule the idea of a leftist insurrection. "Insurrection is a political phenomenon,"
said Col. Juan Orlando Zepeda. "It won't happen just because (guerrilla commanders) wish it to.
What we see instead is a decomposition of the subversive forces into acts of terrorism." Privately,
army leaders are less sure. Col. Zepeda himself headed army intelligence prior to his transfer to
the capital-based First Brigade last June. Before leaving the intelligence office, Zepeda wrote an
internal paper summarizing the military's knowledge of the insurgents. The paper concludes by
asking, "To what degree do the subversives have the quantitative and qualitative forces sufficient for
launching a general offensive?" The author answers his own question: "We cannot determine this
with precision." (Basic data from CAU back issues, "FMLN Fall Offensive Sweeps El Salvador," by
Mike Zielinski, in Frontline, 11/07/88)

-- End --
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